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NARCOTIC ADDICTION AND CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DURHAM 
ADDISON M. BOWMAN* 
This article relates the Durham rule of crimimit responsibility to the 
1tarcotic addict. After reviewing the leading cases refining the Durham rule 
in the District of Columbia, the author examines the medical literature 
describing the disease of addiction. Finally, he amityzes this disease in terms 
of criminal responsibility under Durham, and concludes that a showing of 
addiction should be sufficient to present a jury question of insanity. His 
analysis also includes suggestions for the presentation of the insanity defense 
i1t this type of case. 
Although the medical profession has long recognized narcotic addic-
tion as an illness, the law has only recently begun to view the addict as a 
sick person. Until Robinson v. California,! decided by the Supreme Court 
in 1962, it was possible for a state to enact legislation authorizing punish-
ment of the addict,2 not because of his possession or use of narcotics, but 
solely because of his addiction. The attitude of the law toward the addict 
has been shaped partly by misconception and ignorance,s and partly by 
persistent emphasis of the goals of suppression and eventual elimination 
of narcotic use through the imposition of severe penalties for violations 
of the narcotic laws.4 Until quite recently, the impact of narcotic addic-
* Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Agency, Washington, D.C. A.B., Dartmouth College; LL.B., 
Dickinson School of Law; LLM., Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 370 U.S. 660 (1962). This case invalidated a California statute which authorized criminal 
conviction for use of narcotics or for addiction to narcotics, on the ground that imprison-
ment based upon addiction alone constitutes cruel and unusual punishment violative of the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments. 
2 As of October 1961 at least sixteen states had statutes in force making addiction a 
crime punishable by imprisonment. See A:MEIuCAN BAR FOUNDATION, NARCOTICS AND THE 
LAw 149-93 (1962). 
S There can be little doubt that nonmedical use of narcotic drugs is repugnant to the 
religious and philosophical heritage of the American people. ld. at 13-14. Nevertheless, as 
the Robinson Court pointed out, we would be loathe to punish those afflicted with leprosy 
or venereal disease. 370 U.S. at 666. There is nothing inherently evil about the abuse of 
narcotics; rather it is a medically recognized disease which requires treatment, not incar-
ceration. 
4 The myth of deterrence in the area of narcotics suppression has been dealt a severe 
blow by the President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, headed by 
Circuit Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, which reported: 
The Bureau of Narcotics maintains that the present severe penalties act as a powerful 
deterrent. The Commission does not agree. As the Commission pointed out in its intro-
duction, it is difficult to believe that a narcotic addict who is physically and psycholog-
1017 
1018 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53: p,1017 
tion on criminal responsibility had been given little or no attention, Sev-
eral recent decisions in the District of Columbia, where the DurhamG 
formulation of legal insanity prevails, however, recognize that the addict 
may not be criminally responsible for some of his antisocial behavior,s 
In short, he may be legally insane, This article will attempt to explore 
the relationship of narcotic addiction to criminal responsibility, the 
ultimate question being: to what extent can the addictT accused of 
crime avail himself of the insanity defense under the Durham rule?8 
ically dependent on a drug will forego satisfaction of his craving for fear of a long 
prison sentence . • . • The weakness of the deterrence position is proved every day 
by the fact that the illicit traffic in narcotics and marijuana continues. 
THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM'N ON NARCOTIC AND DRUG ABUSE, FINAL REPORT 40 (1963) 
[hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S REpORT). 
A similar position was recently taken by the Advisory Council of Judges of the National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency, which stated that the federal and state laws outlawing 
possession of narcotics actually aid underworld traffickers because physicians are deterred 
from treating the addicts, who are then forced to tum to illegal sources. "The narcotic addict 
is a sick person, physically and psychologically, and as such is entitled to qualified medical 
attention just as are other sick people." Washington Post, June 22, 1964, p. A3, col. 4-5. 
5 Durham v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954); see pp. 1021-22 
infra. 
o See Castle v. United States, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1964); Horton v. United States, 115 
U.S. App. D.C. 184, 317 F.2d 595,596 (1963). In two recent trials in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, addicts were found not guilty by reason of insanity 
because of their addiction. United States v. BroWD, Crim. No. 274-63, March 31, 1965; 
United States v. Prince, Crim. No. 349-63, March 17, 1964, discussed in Washington Post, 
March 18, 1964, p. B6, col. 1; cf. BroWD v. United States, 331 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1964); 
Hightower v. United States, 117 U.s. App. D.C. 43, 325 F.2d 616 (1963). Btlt see Heard 
v. United States, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1964), petition for rehearing en batlc denied, opinions 
and order modified, No. 18290, May 12, 1965, which held that a showing of narcotic addic-
tion, without more, did not raise a jury issue of criminal responsibility so as to require an 
instruction on insanity. 
1 For purposes of this article, an "addict" is one who has developed physical and 
psychological dependence on a narcotic drug of the opiate class or a synthetic equivalent. 
Narcotic drugs in the opiate class include opium, morphine, heroin, dionon, diIaudid, metopon, 
codeine, eucodal and dicodide. Their synthetic equivalents include demerol, methadone, 
dromoran, phenazocine and leritine. These drugs all vary in addiction liability, Excellent 
descriptions of these drugs are found in MAURER & VOGEL, NARCOTICS AND NARCOTIC AnDIC-
TION 53-72 (2d ed. 1962). 
Note that this listing excludes addicting nonopiate sedatives such as barbiturates, bromides 
and marijuana, and stimulant drugs, such as cocaine and benzedrine. There are several 
reasons for this exclusion: almost all of today's addicts use drugs of the opiate class; these 
nonopiate drugs affect the user in many different waySj and many of the generalizations 
regarding opiate addiction do not hold true for these other drugs. The effects of these 
drugs are described in MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra at 90-128. 
Statistics published by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics indicate that, of the 47,489 addicts 
reported as of December 31, 1962, all but ninety-seven were addicted to an opiate or syn-
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Brown 'V. United States 
The District of Columbia Code provides 'that whenever a person is 
arrested and, prior to the imposition of sentence 
it shall appear to the court from the court's own observations, or from prima 
facie evidence submitted to the court, that the accused is of unsound mind or 
is mentally incompetent so as to be unable to understand the proceedings 
against him or properly to assist in his own defense, the court may order the 
accused committed [to a mental hospital for examination and observation].9 
The purpose of such commitment, which is normally accomplished prior 
to trial, is twofold: to permit a determination of competency to stand trial, 
and to provide a reliable opinion on the matter of criminal responsibility 
for use at the trial itself.10 Indeed, this form of commitment is often the 
only means by which an indigent accused can secure expert opinion evi-
dence for the insanity defense. While it is by no means clear what quan-
tum of evidence will justify or require pretrial commitment under this 
provision, it is at least settled that less evidence than that amount neces-
thetic equivalent. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropria-
tiOIIS, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 458 (extract from TREAsURy-POST OFFICE DEPT's & EXEC. 
OFFICE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1964). In addition, the FBN reports that ninety-four per cent 
of these addicts are addicted to heroin, and that this preference for heroin has existed for the 
last ten years or more. Id. at 467. These figures do not include marijuana users because, since 
marijuana does not produce physical dependence in the user, the FBN does not consider 
it an addicting drug. Note, however, the World Health Organization's definition of drug 
addiction, which apparently contemplates some addiction without physical dependence. See 
note 94 infra. 
B No examination of the M'Naghten formulation of criminal responsibility, which excuses 
only those who do not understand either the nature or wrongfulness of their conduct, will 
be offered, for it would seem clear that the vast majority of addicts who commit criminal 
acts understand the nature and quality of their acts and appreciate the wrongfulness of 
their conduct. The M'Naghten rule has been roundly criticized by psychiatrists and jurists 
as unrealistic and outmoded in the light of modem psychiatry and psychology. See, e.g., 
Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for the Law, in LAW AND LITERATURE 101, 109 (1931). 
However, even today this rule prevails in all states save New Hampshire, notwithstanding 
opportunities for change. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Melton, 406 Pa. 343, 178 A.2d 728 
(1962); Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960). 
9 D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(a) (1961). This section provides for commitment for a 
"reasonable period" to the District of Columbia General Hospital or other mental hospital. 
In practice, most commitments from the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, which tries all felony offenses in the District, go to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital 
for a period of about sixty days. 
10 Although the statute addresses itself only to the problem of trial competency, it has 
been held that the hospital should report to the court on the question of criminal respon-
sibility as well. Winn v. United States, 106 U.S. App. D.C. 133, 270 F.2d 326 (1959). 
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sary to raise a jury question of criminal responsibility will suffice.11 The 
rationale is that, were the accused in possession of conclusive evidence 
of mental illness, he would have no need for further mental observation.12 
Brown v. United States/3 decided Apri110, 1964, held that, since "the 
defense of insanity based on drug addiction generally presents a jury is-
sue as to criminal responsibility,m4 an accused addict who moves for 
mental examination is entitled to the assistance of the court in developing 
the basis for his insanity defense. Defendant Brown had moved for a 
mental examination, alleging a history of narcotic addiction which was 
uncontroverted by the Government. The denial of this motion1G and the 
denial of motions to subpoena psychiatrists were the sole issues presented 
on appeal. The court of appeals has thus unequivocally concluded that 
narcotic addiction constitutes prima facie evidence of mental illness for 
purposes of pretrial mental observation. This decision should be quite 
persuasive in other jurisdictions which utilize tests for criminal respon-
sibility similar to Durham and which provide for pretrial mental observa-
tion at government expense.16 
11 Mitchell v. United States, 114 U.S. App. D.C. 353, 359, 316 F.2d 353, 360 (1963). 
Considering that only "more than a scintilla" of evidence is needed to raise the issue of 
criminal responsibility, see McDonald v. United States, 114 U.S. App. D.C. 120, 312 F.2d 
847 (1962) (en bane), it would seem that very little evidence indeed would satisfy the 
statutory standard, "prima facie evidence," thus construed. However, the indigent, unablo 
to hire a psychiatrist for this purpose, is often hard put to produce any evidence at all 
unless he has a history of mental illness. 
12 Mitchell v. United States, supra note 11, at 359, 316 F.2d at 360. 
13 331 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
14 ld. at 823, citing Horton v. United States, 115 U.s. App. D.C. 184,317 F.2d 595 (1963), 
and Hightower v. United States, 117 U.S. App. D.C. 43, 325 F.2d 616 (1963). But see Heard 
v. United States, - F.2d -, - n.3 (D,C. Cir. 1964), discussed pp. 1025-26 infra. 
15 In all, the defendant had moved three times for a mental examination, and had moved 
twice to subpoena a psychiatrist. All these motions had been denied. 
16 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958), applicable in United States district courts, provides that upon 
a showing that an accused "may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent 
as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own 
defense," the court shall cause the accused to be mentally examined by at least one qualified 
psychiatrist. Under this section the court may also order commitment to a mental hospital 
for observation. 
Decisions construing this provision do not spell out clearly the requirements for a prima 
facie showing of insanity or incompetency, except that the motion must be nonfrivolous 
and presented in good faith. See Kenner v. United States, 286 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1960) j 
Wear v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 325, 218 F.2d 24 (1954). However, in Krupnick 
v. United States, 264 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1959), a narcotic addict who had been convicted 
of uttering forged prescriptions was successful in obtaining a reversal in the court of appeals 
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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In 1895, the Supreme Court, in Davis v. United States,17 set forth cer-
tain basic rules for the guidance of federal courts in criminal cases 
wherein the defense of insanity is raised. Every defendant, stated the 
Court, is to be presumed sane until "some evidence" is offered to rebut 
this presumption.1s Once the presumption is rebutted, the Government, 
in order to convict, must produce evidence which, together with the pre-
sumption of sanity, excludes beyond a reasonable doubt the hypothesis 
of insanity.19 This allocation of proof is irrespective of any test for 
criminal responsibility, although it is at once apparent that the weight 
of the Government's burden is directly related to the prevailing criteria 
for criminal responsibility. It follows that federal decisions concerning 
criminal responsibility since 1895 have been primarily concerned with 
defining the qualitative and quantitative standards the Government must 
meet to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Growing dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten standards of criminal 
responsibility led to the 1954 Durham v. United States2° decision by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The court rejected the M'Naghten rules, because they placed undue 
emphasis on the cognitive element, which, the court noted, is not the 
sole or even the most important symptom of mental disorder. Rather 
than rest the determination of criminal responsibility on any symptom 
of mental illness, the court decided to adopt a test which would allow 
because he had been denied a mental examination, although apparently the only evidence 
presented to the trial court on this question was that the defendant had been a user of 
narcotics for a considerable period of time. A similar result was reached under similar 
facts, including narcotic addiction, in Lloyd v. United States, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 116, 247 
F.2d 522 (1957). 
17 160 U.S. 469 (1895). 
1S [d. at 486-87. 
19 The Court articulated the test as follows: "If the whole evidence, including that sup-
plied by the presumption of sanity, does not exclude beyond reasonable doubt the hypothesis 
of insanity, of which some proof is adduced, the accused is entitled to an acquittal of 
the specific offense charged." [d. at 488. This rule has been modified to the following extent: 
the fact that the defense produces "some evidence" of insanity does not necessarily require 
acquittal in the absence of government rebuttal testimony, because the quanta of evidence 
required to raise the issue and to compel a directed verdict (even when uncontradicted) are 
different. In McDonald v. United States, 114 U.S. App. D.C. 120, 312 F.2d 847 (1962), the 
court stated: "Whether uncontradicted evidence, including expert opinion evidence, which 
is sufficient to raise a jury question on the mental issue is also sufficient to require a di-
rected verdict depends upon its weight and credibility." Id. at 123, 312 F.2d at 850. 
20 94 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954). 
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the trier of fact to view the entire mental makeup of the accused in its 
relationship to the crime with which he stands charged. This was accom-
plished with the disarmingly simple phrase: "[A]n accused is not crimin-
ally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or 
mental defect.ll21 In practical effect, this meant that henceforth the 
Government would be required, upon a showing of some evidence of 
mental disorder, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that the 
accused had no mental disease or defect, or that the criminal activity 
charged was not the product of mental disease or defect. By way of defini-
tion the court merely stated that a "disease" was a condition capable 
of improving or deteriorating, and that a "defect" was a condition not 
capable of improving or deteriorating which might be congenital, the re-
sult of injury or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease.22 Ten 
years of experience with the Durham rule have clarified and refined the 
terms "mental disease," "mental defect" and "product." No further dis-
cussion of the term "mental defect" will be undertaken here; however, 
many of the decisions purporting to delimit the concept of mental dis-
ease also concern themselves, in general terms, with mental defects.23 
The problems which have arisen in connection with the term "mental dis-
ease" are largely attributable to the fact that the question whether or 
not a given condition constitutes a mental disease must in each case be 
resolved by the trier of fact, since the matter of criminal responsibility 
is a legal, rather than medical, problem.24 The determination may be very 
simple in a case where all the experts agree, for example, that the 
accused is suffering from a severe disorder causing him to be psychotic, 
21 ld. at 241, 214 F.2d at 874-75. Most commentators immediately hailed the Dllrhatu 
decision. See, e.g., Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 
325 (1955); Weiliofen, The Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 356 (1955). 
But see Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 367 (1955). 
22 94 U.S. App. D.C. at 241, 214 F.2d at 875. 
23 The primary concern of the trier of fact must not be the medical label for the ac-
cused's illness, be it disease or defect, nor must it be the psychiatrists' conclusions as to 
whether or not the illness constitutes a disease or defect in the Durham sense. Rather, the 
courts have stressed the importance of expert testimony designed to acquaint the jury with 
the impact of the illness on the accused's mental processes and behavior controls. See pp. -
infra. Hence, it can be seen that whether one is suffering from a disease; as distinguished from 
a defect, is not of ultimate concern. 
24 See Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Currens, 
290 F.2d 751, 763 (3d Cir. 1961); Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 331, 334 (1955). 
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and that this disorder is a mental disease.25 Suppose, however, that the 
psychiatrists are split over the question whether the disorder constitutes 
a mental disease. It will be seen that this problem does arise when the 
"disorder" is narcotic addiction.26 How is the jury to reach an intelligent 
decision when the experts cannot agree? In Carter v. United States,27 
Judge Prettyman explored this problem and concluded that the trier 
of fact must be given more than psychiatric labels, such as schizophrenia, 
paranoia and psychopathy. 
Description and explanation of the origin, development and manifestations of 
the alleged disease are the chief functions of the expert witness. The chief 
value of an expert's testimony in this field, as in all other fields, rests upon the 
material from which his opinion is fashioned and the reasoning by which he 
progresses from his material to his conclusion; in the explanation of the dis-
ease and its dynamics, that is, how it occurred, developed, and affected the 
mental and emotional processes of the defendant . . . .28 
The judge also added that a "mental disease" must be a "medically 
recognized illness of the mind,"29 perhaps realizing that he had not entirely 
laid the problem to rest. 
In Blocker v. United States,30 decided by the court of appeals in 1961, 
three judges expressed dissatisfaction with the Durham rule as then inter-
preted. Judge Burger, in a concurring opinion, charged that "mental dis-
ease" was a "dangerously vague" term.31 His concern was based in part 
on the fact that Saint Elizabeth's Hospital had recently taken the position 
that sociopathic or psychopathic personality disturbances amounted 
to mental disease.32 The jury, given little or no explanation of the ter-
25 Even in this example, however, it can be seen that the trier of fact has little choice 
but to accept the legal conclusions of the experts. 
26 For example, in Horton v. United States, 115 U.S. App. D.C. 184, 317 F.2d 595 (1963), 
the sole defense presented at the trial had been insanity based on drug addiction. Two 
psychiatrists had testified that the defendant had no mental disease, three that the de-
fendant's alleged acts were the product of mental disease, and one that the defendant simply 
suffered from mental disease. "Thus," said the court, "a jury issue was presented on the 
issue of criminal responsibility." ld. at 185, 317 F.2d at 596. 
27 102 U.S. App. D.C. 227, 252 F.2d 608 (1957). 
28 ld. at 236, 252 F.2d at 617. 
20 Ibid. 
80 110 U.S. App. D.C. 41, 288 F.2d 853 (en bane), 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 581 (1961). 
81 ld. at 49, 288 F.2d at 861 (concurring opinion). 
82 In Campbell v. United States, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 260, 274, 307 F.2d 597, 611 (1962), 
Judge Burger, in a dissenting opinion, was similarly concerned with the "expansion" of 
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minology, could hardly fail to find in accordance with the conclusory opin-
ions of the experts. Judge Burger advocated renewed emphasis in the 
trial court's charge on the elements of cognition and capacity to control 
behavior.33 
In 1962, the court of appeals, sitting en bane, decided McDonald v. 
United States,34 which sets forth the current law in the District of Colum-
bia. The court reaffirmed its position that the jury would not be bound 
by the conc1usory opinions of the experts because the experts cannot be 
permitted the ultimate determination of criminal responsibility. Therefore, 
stated the court: 
[T]he jury should be told that a mental disease or defect includes any abnonnal 
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes 
and substantially impairs behavior controls. Thus the jury would consider 
testimony concerning the development, adaptation and functioning of these 
proceSses and controls.35 
McDonald concerned an allegedly mentally defective defendant with an 
I. Q. of sixty-eight, who had other mental abnormality. The court noted 
that the evidence of retarded mentality, by itself, might not have satis-
fied the "some evidence" standard, but that with the other evidence a 
jury issue had been presented.36 Regarding the meaning of "some evi-
dence," the court stated that it required more than a scintilla to place the 
burden of proving sanity on the Government, but that the evidence, for 
the term "mental disease" to include the mental illness known as "emotionally unstable 
personality." 
33 This thesis was further developed by Judge Burger in Frigillana v. United States, 113 
U.s. App. D.C. 328, 307 F.2d 665 (1962). 
34 114 U.S. App. D.C. 120, 312 F.2d 847 (1962) (en banc). 
a5 Id. at 124, 312 F.2d at 851. The court further explained that its formulation was neces-
sary because a psychiatrist diagnoses a mental condition as a disease or defect for clinical 
treatment purposes, where criminal responsibility is not at issue. 
Chief Judge Bazelon recently reemphasized the necessity for "a full explanation of the 
dynamics of the defendant's personality," in a case in which the psychiatric testimony had 
been largely conclusory. Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Bazelon 
further noted that "the frequent failure to adequately explain and support expert psychiatric 
opinion threatens the administration of the insanity defense in the District of Columbia." 
Ibid. See also Jackson v. United States, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1964) (separate opinion). 
36 It should be noted here that, to present evidence sufficient to raise a jury issue of 
criminal responsibility, only "some evidence" of mental disease or defect need be produced. 
The defendant need not present any evidence at all of causation or prodUctivity. See 
Frigillana v. United States, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 307 F.2d 665 (1962). It then is incum-
bent upon the prosecution to prove either that no disease or defect existed, or that there 
was no productivity. 
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this purpose, did not need to be so strong as to require a directed verdict. 
Furthermore, said the court, doubts were to be resolved in the defendant's 
favor. 
Regarding the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict of not guilty 
by reason of insanity when the Government failed to produce evidence 
on this issue, the McDonald court stated that this depended upon the 
weight and credibility of the evidence offered by the defendant.37 That is, 
the mere fact that the defendant has produced "some evidence," and 
thereby has presented a jury issue, does not necessarily mean that he is 
'entitled to a directed verdict, even in the absence of countervailing evi-
dence. Whether the Government must adduce testimony of sanity to avoid 
a directed verdict would seem to depend on factors such as the severity 
of the mental illness described and whether or not the defendant has 
offered expert testimony.38 
A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit, Heard v. United States,39 held that "a showing of 
narcotics addiction, without more, does not constitute 'some evidence' of 
mental disease or 'insanity' and does not raise the issue of criminal respon-
sibility so as to require giving the Durham-McDonald instruction."40 The 
court suggested that evidence of deprivation of narcotics at the time of ilie 
alleged offense would be evidence of impairment of behavior controls, and 
would require that the instruction be given. In his dissent, Judge Wright 
indicated that the government psychiatrists had testified that the defend-
ant's addiction would affect his mental and emotional processes and his be-
havior controls. Therefore, he reasoned, "some evidence" of mental illness 
had been presented, notwithstanding the experts' conc1usory opinions that 
the defendant did not suffer from mental disease or defect. The validity of 
the majority holding will be examined subsequently. But considering the 
number of times the court of appeals has said in dictum that "the de-
fense of insanity based on drug addiction generally presents a jury issue as 
37 114 u.s. App. D.C. at 123, 312 F.2d at 850. Note that the production of "some 
evidence" of insanity does not nullify the presumption of sanity, which, according to Davis 
v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), remains in every case and is to be considered, 
together with all the evidence, by the trier of fact. Keys v. United States, No. 18786, D.C. 
Cir., April 29, 1965. 
38 Although the defendant invoking the insanity defense is well advised to offer expert 
testimony, he may be able to get to the jury without it. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 
115 U.S. App. D.C. 303, 318 F.2d 274 (1963). 
80 -F.2d-(D.C. Cir. 1964). 
4.0 -F.2d at -. 
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to criminal responsibilitY,"41 it would seem that the Heard decision should 
not be interpreted broadly. 
The meaning of the word "product" in the Durham formula has also 
caused much difficulty over the years. The principal problem has been that, 
given mental illness, it is almost always impossible for a psychiatrist 
to state that the illness did not produce the crime.42 The witness therefore 
either answers affirmatively or declines to express an opinion on this sub-
ject, both of which results are fatal to the Government, which has the 
burden of proving the negative beyond a reasonable doubt.43 In Carter v. 
United States,44 Judge Prettyman articulated a "but for" test for deter-
mining productivity under Durham. He stated that: 
there must be a relationship between the disease and the act, and that relation-
ship, whatever it may be in degree, must be, as we have already said, critical in 
its effect in respect to the act .... [By this we mean] that the facts concerning 
the disease and the facts concerning the act are such as to justify reasonably the 
conclusion that "But for the disease the act would not have been committed."4G 
This apparently means that the Government must prove that the de-
fendant would have committed the crime even had he not been mentally 
ill. This particular conclusion is one which psychiatrists are apparently 
quite hesitant to reach. Judge Prettyman suggested, however, that if the 
expert testimony is directed toward an explanation of the dynamics of 
the defendant's mental condition and the effect of that condition on the 
defendant's mental or emotional processes and behavior controls, the jury 
will have been given enough information to decide the productivity 
question with reasonable accuracy.46 
By way of brief summary, a defendant in the District of Columbia need 
introduce only more than a scintilla of evidence of mental disorder to 
create a jury issue of criminal responsibility. He will have to offer sub-
41 See note 14 supra and accompanying text. This statement was aIso repeated in Castle 
v. United States, -F.2d-,-n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1964), and in Jackson v. United States, 
-F.2d-,-(D.C. Cir. 1964) (separate opinion of Bazelon, C.J.). 
42 See Frigillana v. United States, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 307 F.2d 665 (1962), where 
not one of seven defense psychiatrists could offer an unequivocal opinion on this question. 
Judge Burger emphasized this uncertainty and quoted ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL Mmn 270 
(1958), to the effect that the "product" question can be answered only affirmatively or not 
at all. 
43 The prosecution, of course, may sustain its burden by proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that no mental disease or defect existed at the time in question. 
44 102 U.s. App. D.C. 227, 252 F.2d 608 (1957). 
45 ld. at 236, 252 F.2d at 617. 
'{6 Ibid. 
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stantial evidence, however, to obtain a directed verdict even in the ab-
sence of rebuttal testimony. Assuming the Government successfully avoids 
the directed verdict, . the jury will be told that, unless they are satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the accused did not suffer from men-
tal disease or defect at the time of the offense, or (2) that the crime was 
not produced by mental disease or defect, they Cannot return a verdict of 
guilty. They will also be told that the terms "mental disease or'defect" 
include any mental abnormality which substantially affects mental or 
emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls, and that 
the term "product" denotes that the act would not have been committed 
but for the abnormality. 
It is interesting to compare these criteria with the proposed standards' 
for criminal responsibility contained in the most recent draft of the 
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which states: 
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such 
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of law. . 
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not 
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise . 
antisocial conduct.47 
In the comments to this section of the model code,48 the drafters rational-
ize their rejection of M'Naghten, even when supplanted by the "irre-
sistible impulse" test,' in much the same fashion Judge Bazelon did in 
Durham.49 They suggest that the impairment of capacity to control be-
47 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955). 
40 The "irresistible impulse" test had been adopted in the District of Columbia in Smith 
v, United States, 59 App. D.C. 144,36 F.2d 548 (1929), where the court stated that an un-
controllable impulse in the mind which overrides reason and judgment and obliterates the 
sense of right and wrong to the extent that one is deprived of the power to choose 
between right and wrong amounts to legal insanity. In Durham, the court suggested that 
its new standard would encompass not only sudden impulses but also impulses following 
brooding or reflection which might not have qualified under the Smith case. 
Since the Durham decision, the jury may be permitted to consider the question of ir-
resistible impulse, but the ultimate issue must always be framed in terms of the Durham-
McDonald standards. Misenheimer v. United States, 106 U.S. App. D.C. 220, 271 F.2d 486 
(1959). However, if properly instructed that a mental disease is any abnormal mental 
condition which substantially affects mental processes and substantially impairs behavior 
controls, the jury should have no difficulty finding mental illness in all instances where 
formerly it would have found an irresistible impulse. The new test requires only sub-
stantial impairment of behavior controls, whereas the Smith formulation seemed to require 
a total lack of power to choose between right and wrong. 
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havior is no less important in this determination than the impairment of 
cognition. They also wish to include acts over which the individual had no 
control but which would not faU within the ambit of the "irresistible im-
pulse" test because they may not have been sudden and spontaneous.GO 
They reject the Durham formulation, however, because of the ambigu-
ity of the term "product," suggesting that "if interpreted to lead to ir-
responsibility unless the defendant would have engaged in the criminal 
conduct even if he had not suffered from the disease or defect, it [the 
term] is too broad .... "51 Their model formulation employs a criterion 
of causation which resembles a "substantial factor" test.52 
The only real difference between the two formulations, then, would 
seem to be that Durham purports to exclude mental conditions which do 
not result in substantial incapacity to control behavior and recognizes 
slight degrees of causation, whereas the ALI formulation utilizes the 
element of substantial incapacity to control behavior on the causation 
question, and merely excludes those diseases and defects whose only symp-
tomatology is repeated antisocial conduct. Considering that the question 
of criminal responsibility is usually resolved by the jury, it would seem 
that this is not a difference of substance.lia A growing number of juris-
dictions have adopted tests resembling the ALI formulation.1l4 
50 The drafters knew that "the application of the principle [of substantial capacity to 
control conduct] will call, of course, for a distinction between incapacity, upon the one 
hand, and mere indisposition on the other. Such a distinction is inevitable in the applica-
tion of a standard addressed to impairment of volition. We believe that the distinction 
can be made." MODEL PENAL CODE 158 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955). 
51 ld. at 159. 
52 Professor Wechsler suggests: 
If my questions about the ambiguities involved in "product" are good, and I think 
they are, I do not think the concept can be used at all. In short, I think we must 
insist that it is only when causality inheres in the substantial impairment of capacity that 
irresponsibility can be acknowledged to obtain. 
ld. at 188. Tbis is an excerpt from a fascinating and revealing correspondence between Prof. 
Wechsler and Dr. Manfred Guttmacher regarding the criteria for criminal responsibility to 
be employed in the Model Penal Code. ld. at 182-92. 
5S In dictum, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently suggested 
that it would not disapprove any jury charge "if the charge appropriately embraces and 
requires positive findings as to 3 necessary elements, namely, the defendant's cogllitiOtl, his 
volition, and his capacity to control his behavior." Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 
759 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 998 (1962); see Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 
214, 242-45 (8th Cir. 1962). 
54 See, e.g., United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961), where Chief Judge 
.Biggs rejected the M'Naghten formulation and adopted a new test for criminal responsibility 
for the Third Circuit. He stated: "The jury must be satisfied that at the time of com-
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Two important principles to be gleaned from the foregoing discussion 
will have a decisive bearing on the relationship of narcotic addiction to 
criminal responsibility. The first is that both of these modern standards 
emphasize the element of capacity to control behavior or to conform be-
havior to prescribed standards. If a defendant, because of mental disease, 
defect or abnormality, substantially lacked this capacity at the time he 
acted, his act was not a crime. Secondly, it cannot be overemphasized that 
criminal responsibility is always a legal, not a medical, determination. 
The law must provide the framework and the controlling criteria to allow 
the trier of fact intelligently to assess the medical testimony and to arrive 
at the proper conclusion in accordance with traditional legal principles. 
Perhaps the only flaw in the Durham formulation, prior to McDonald, 
was that it failed to provide these criteria and therefore tended to place 
the difficult problems of criminal responsibility in the unreceptive hands 
of the psychiatrists. 
THE ADDICTION DISEASE 
Before examining the direct effects of addiction on the behavior of the 
addict, it will be helpful to note that most narcotic addicts suffer from un-
derlying mental disorders that predated and probably contributed to their 
use of narcotics. In some instances, these disorders will in themselves 
negate criminal responsibility. Among the many attempts which have been 
made to classify the personality types into which addicts can be placed, 
the following classification appears to be simplest and most complete: 
1. Normal individuals accidentally addicted; 
2. Individuals with personality disorders of all types (formerly called 
psychopaths) ; 
mitting the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked 
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is 
alleged to have violated." Id. at 774; see Dusky v. United States, supra note 53. In Manual 
on Jury Instructions in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.Rn. 523, 560 (1964), promulgated 
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of IDinois, the following 
charge on insanity is suggested: 
The defendant has interposed insanity as a defense. The law presumes that a de-
fendant is sane. This presumption is rebuttable. Where a defendant introduces some 
evidence that he had a mental disease or defect at the time of the commission of the 
crime charged, the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
did not have a mental disease, or that despite the mental disease he had the capacity 
either to know the criminality of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law. 
The issue of whether or not a mental disease or defect existed at the time of the 
commission of the crime must be determined by the jury on the basis of all evidence, 
lay and expert, and the presumption of sanity. 
1030 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53: p.l017 
3. Psychoneurotic individuals of all types; 
4. Narcotic addicts with associated psychoses.55 
Normal individuals accidentally addicted make up a very small per-
centage of the total addict population.56 These are the individuals who 
have received narcotics over an extended period of treatment for physical 
illness, and who remain addicted thereafter.57 Noyes and Kolb suggest 
that "probably all persons who acquire addiction in this manner have 
some fundamental emotional problem that caused them to continue the 
use of drugs beyond the period of medical need,'lUs the theory being that 
the controlled quantities of narcotics administered in the treatment set-
ting will not produce or lead to addiction unless the individual has emo-
tional or personality difficulties which give rise to a psychological need.aD 
55 See Felix, An Appraisal of the Personality Types of the Addict, 100 A:M.. J. PSYCHIATRY 
462, 465 (1944). The more traditional Kolb classification of personality types of addicts 
listed six categories: (1) normal individuals accidentally addicted; (2) individuals ,vith 
psychopathic diathesis or predisposition; (3) psychoneurotic individuals of all types; (4) 
individuals without psychosis, but with psychopathic personalities of all types; (5) addicts 
with inebriate personalities; and (6) addicts ,vith associated psychoses. See Kolb & Ossen-
fort, The Treatment of Drug Addicts at the Lexington Hospital, 31 So. Mm. J. 914, 916 
(1938). Felix maintained that category (5) would in all events be included in either cate-
gory (2), (3) or (4). Felix, Some Comments on the Psychopathology of Drug Addictioll, 23 
MENTAL HYGIENE 567, 570 (1939). He later concluded that category (2), psychopathic 
diathesis, is often a catchall classification, and that individuals so classified should be placed 
in either the psychotic, psychoneurotic, or psychopathic (sociopathic) classification. 100 A:M.. 
J. PSYCHIATRY at 463. A more recent article discusses Felix's four classifications ,vith approval, 
and concludes that Kolb's psychopathic diathesis type is simply a personality disorder group 
with less severity than the true psychopath (or sociopath, in modern terminology). Vogel, 
Isbell & Chapman, Present Status of Narcotics Addiction, 138 A.M.A.J. 1019, 1021 (1948). 
See also WIXLER, OPIATE ADDICTION 4 (1953); MAURER & VOGEL, NARCOTICS AND NARCOTIC 
ADDICTION 82 (2d ed. 1962). 
56 HoCH: & ZUBIN, PROBLEMS OF ADDICTION AND HABITUATION 2-3 (1958); MAURER & 
VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 55, at 82-83; MARIE NYSWANDER ROBINSON, THE DRUG ADDICT AS 
A PATIENT 62 (1956); Cameron, Addiction-C1Irrent Issues, 120 A:M.. J. PSYCHIATRY 313, 
314 (1963); Winick, Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment, 22 LAw & CONTEMl'. PROB. 9, 
21 (1957). 
57 These individuals are addicted in the sense that they have developed physical de-
pendence on the drug; however, they develop little or no psychological dependence and, 
therefore, contrary to popular thinking, are not likely to relapse after undergoing with-
drawal. MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 55, at 83. In these days of strict narcotics 
control, this category is much Jess significant than it was thirty or forty years ago. Maurer 
and Vogel note that, of 1,000 recent admissions to the Lexington Hospital, only five per 
cent were considered "medical addicts." Ibid. 
58 NoYES & KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 475 (6th ed. 1963). 
59 Some patients are, of course, unavoidably addicted during treatment, as, for example, 
.a terminal cancer patient, but these individuals are not considered here. 
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The great majority of addicts present some form of personality dis-
turbance,60 which illness often is manifested by a pattern of antisocial 
behavior, rather than by observable mental symptons.61 These individuals, 
because of an unsatisfactory adjustment, find themselves unable to attain 
the objects of fundamental drives such as security, sex and power. The re-
sultant inner tensions and frustrations produce various amounts of hos-
tility, immaturity and aggressiveness,62 which are assuaged by the arti-
ficial pleasure and peace afforded by the drug. A substantial number of 
these individuals are diagnosed as having inadequate personalities,63 
which "are characterized by inadequate response to intellectual, emotional, 
social and physical demands."64 They display "inadaptability, ineptness, 
60 CHEIN, GERARD, LEE & ROSENFELD, THE ROAD TO H, at 14, 194 (1964); NoYES & KoI.B, 
op. cit. supra note 58, at 474; MARIE NYSWANDER ROBlNSON, op. cit. supra note 56, at 62-63; 
Meiselas, A Report of Some Early Clinical Experiences from the New York State Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene's Narcotic Research Unit, at 4, presented to the National Research 
Council Committee on Drug Addiction and Narcotics, New York City, Jan. 29, 1962; 
Clausen, Social and Psychological Factors in Narcotics Addiction, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 34, 43-44 (1957); Vogel, Isbell & Chapman, supra note 55, at 1021; Winick, supra 
note 56, at 20; Editorial, 184 A.M.A.J. 962 (1963). 
Apparently, the British statistics are similar. Lady Frankau, a London psychiatrist who 
has treated some 500 addicts, has been quoted as follows: "The only way to help the 
addict is to treat his underlying problems. Every one I have treated has had a personality 
disorder. These are inadequate people, immature and unstable, with a low threshold for 
pain and unable to bear their frustrations." Samuels, The British Way With the "Junkie," 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1964, § 6 (Magazine), pp. 37, 134. 
61 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, MENTAL 
DISORDERS 34 (1952) [hereinafter cited as DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL]. This does 
not mean, however, that a pattern of antisocial behavior justifies a diagnosis of personality 
disorder which, in turn, excuses the antisocial behavior. Cameron has ably pointed out that 
sociopathy is a diagnosable clinical syndrome, and that it can be recognized by a combina-
tion of most of the following positive findings, which are the hallmarks of sociopathy: 
1) an inability to put off present pleasure for future gain; 2) lack of aim and of fore-
sight; 3) failure to learn from experience; 4) impulsiveness; 5) egocentricity; 6) a 
lack of lasting emotional rapport with others; 7) a lack of sympathy; 8) general im-
maturity; and 9) little regulatory influence of intellect on behavior. Please note that 
many criminals do not show at least six of these nine criteria (1, 2, 3, 4, 8, and 9). 
Also note that antisocial behavior is not listed since it really is not a medical symptom 
in the true sense. 
Cameron, Is Sociopathy (Psychopathy) a Sufficient Mental Abnormality to Support a F"md-
ing of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity?, presented to the Section on Judicial Administra-
tion, American Bar Ass'n, Chicago, Ill., Aug. 10, 1963. 
62 Felix, Some Commellts 011 the Psychopathology of Drug Addictioll, 23 MENTAL HYGIENE 
567, 571-73 (1939). See generally NoYES & KOLB, op. cit. supra note 58, at 58-65, 458-71. 
63 COUNCIIl ON MENTAL HEALTH, REl'ORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION 10, adopted by the AMA-
in 1957 and published in NARCOTICS ADDICTION (AMA pub. 1963) [hereinafter cited as AMA 
REpORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION]; Cameron, supra note 56, at 314. 
~4 DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 35. 
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poor judgment, lack of physical and emotional stamina, and social incom-
patibility."65 With respect to legal insanity apart from their addiction, 
no general rule regarding persons with personality disorders can be for-
mulated. Many such individuals have been acquitted by reason of in-
sanity,OO but many undoubtedly do not present a mental disease in the 
McDonald sense. To what extent the added factor of addiction should 
tip the balance in favor of exculpation will be considered later. 
Psychoneurotic individuals, who account for a substantial minority 
of the addict population,01 manifest anxiety resulting from repressed 
emotions, aggressive impulses and external threats or losses. Unlike 
psychotics, these individuals do not suffer from gross distortions of reality, 
delusions or hallucinations; rather, many of them adopt various defense 
mechanisms such as sickness, phobias, compulsive behavior and insomnia 
which enable them to believe that their failures are simply the result of 
their illness, without which they would be able to adjust and compete 
successfully in life.6s For these people narcotic drugs afford relief from 
these sicknesses and phobias and also from psychic tension and anxiety. 
They may believe that continued use of the drug is necessary for their 
physical health. This mental illness is more severe than personality dis-
turbance, and, even apart from drug use, its victims are more likely to 
be found not criminally responsible for their antisocial acts. 
Drug addicts with associated psychoses make up a small fraction of 
the addict population,69 and will be given no further consideration. They 
have severe mental disorders, and are hardly ever criminally responsible 
for their antisocial acts, irrespective of narcotic addiction. 
Although the foregoing discussion suggests that most addicts suffer from 
either personality disorders or psychoneuroses, most psychiatrists agree 
05 Ibid. 
06 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 114 U.S. App. D.C. 135, 312 F.2d 862 (1962) 
(sociopathic personality disturbance sufficient to raise jury issue but not to compel judgment 
of acquittal); Campbell v. United States, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 260, 307 F.2d 597 (1962) 
(emotionally unstable personality); Blocker v. United States, 110 U.S. App. D.C. 41, 288 
F.2d 853 (1961) (en banc) (sociopathic personality disturbance). 
61 See BOCH & ZUBIN, op. cit. supra. note 56, at 2-3; AMA REPORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION 
10; Felix, An Appraisal of the Personality Types of the Addict, 100 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 462, 
463 (1944); Wikler & Rasor, Psychiatric Aspects of Drug Addiction, 14 AM. J. MED. 566 
(1953). 
6S Felix, supra. note 67, at 463-64. See generally NoYES & KOLB, op. cit. supra note 58, nt 
419-56. 
~9 See Vogel, Isbell & Chapman, supra. note 55, at 1021; Wilder & Rasor, supra note 67, 
at 566. 
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that addicts today usually possess mixed traits and symptoms. "The ma-
jority of addicts . . . do not fall into clear-cut nosological entities, but 
rather present mixtures of traits of the kind found in neuroses, character 
[personality] disorders, and inadequate personalities. This is a general 
finding in addiction.ll7O No two addicts will present similar symptomatol-
ogy, but most addicts suffer from some mental illness which can lead to a 
genuine psychological need for narcotics. This is not to say that most 
individuals with mental illness become addicted; the point is that these 
personality types are likely to use narcotic drugs to the point of addiction 
once they are introduced to the drug.71 They are addiction prone. It 
has been stated that an addict is 
an inadequately adjusted individual, not radically different from his non-addicted 
fellows, who has at some time discovered that drugs either dulled the sense of 
discomfort produced by his difficulties, or gave him a subjective feeling of 
mastery over his situation. In either case he experienced a release and emotional 
uplift which compensated for the attitude of society toward him.72 
In this context, the Brown decision73 takes on added meaning, for it can-
not be questioned that the fact of addiction is in most instances symptoma-
tic of mental illness.74 
70 AMA REpORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION 10; see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, NARCOTICS 
AND THE LAW 22 (1962). 
71 Maurer and Vogel suggest: 
While there is much more to drug addiction than simply classifying addicts as poorly 
adjusted people who seek a compensation for their own weaknesses, the personality 
defect is clearly manifest in those who are inveterate addicts, and the capacity of opiates 
to give the individual the illusion that he has mastery over life situations about which 
he can do little or nothing, coupled wth the power these drugs have of giving intense 
physical and emotional pleasure, may make them irresistible to addiction-prone people. 
MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 55, at 83. 
72 Felix, supra note 67, at 465. Another authority descn"bes the addict as a person unable 
to adjust to society who needs immediate gratification of his needs and wants to escape 
unbearable tension, and, "simultaneously confronted with the irresistible need for im-
mediate gratification and the ungratifying environment, it is inevitable that he will feel 
justified in employing any measure to rectify his deprivation." Raskin, A Suggested Approach 
to the Problem of Narcotic Addiction, presented to the Division of Medical Sciences, Na-
tional Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Detroit, Mich., April 8, 1960. 
Menninger describes an "addictive personality," which is susceptible to "chemically induced 
escapes from reality ••• [which] clearly represent a partial ego failure." MENNINGER, THE 
VITAL BALANCE 210 (1963). 
73 Brown v. United States, 331 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1964), discussed pp. 1019-20 supra. 
74 See MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 55, at 82; NoYES & KOLB, op. cit. supra note 
58, at 474-75; DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 39; PRESIDENT'S REPORT 86; NARCOTIC 
DRUG STUDY COMM'N, NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, INTERIM REpORT FOR 1963, at 71 (1964) 
[hereinafter cited as N.J. REpORT]; Mental Health Monograph No.2, NARCOTIC DRUG 
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It is also noteworthy that narcotic addiction is most prevalent in large 
metropolitan areas of urban blight and gross socioeconomic deprivation. 
The Federal Bureau of Narcotics has estimated that, as of December 31, 
1962, seventy-nine per cent of the nation's known addicts were to be 
found in ten cities.75 Fifty-five per cent of the addicts are Negroes, 
eighteen per cent Puerto Ricans and Mexicans.76 However, these are the 
groups that are concentrated in the economically deprived areas of our 
large cities, and who are educationally deprived as well. It has been shown 
that areas of Negro and Puerto Rican residence that are less economically 
deprived have a much lower rate of drug use.77 In these metropolitan areas 
ADDICTION 5-6 (Pub. Health Servo Pub. No. 1021, 1963); AMA REpORT ON NARCOTIC AD-
DICTION 10; Ausubel, The Case for Compulsory Closed Ward Treatment of Narcotic Addic-
tion, 31 F.R.D. 58, 69'-70 (1963); Cameron, supra note 56, at 314; Chapman, Methods 01 
Treatment and Management of Drug Addiction, in NARCOTIC DRUG ADDICTION PROBLEMS 
70, 71-73 (Pub. Health Servo Pub. No. 1050, 1963); Chein & Rosenfeld, Juvenile Narcotics 
Use, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 52, 60 (1957); Lowry, Hospital Treatment of the Narcotic 
Addict, Fed. Prob., Dec., 1956, pp. 44-45 i Meiselas, supra note 60, at 4 . 
. 75 BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TRAFFIc IN OPIUM AND OTHER DANGEROUS 
DRUGS 58 (1963). The breakdown was as follows: 
New York, N.Y. 21,566 addicts 
Chicago, m. 6,972 " 
Los Angeles, Calif. 3,183 " 
Detroit, Mich. 1,780 " 
Dist. of Col. 918 " 
San Francisco, Calif. 655 II 
Newark, N .. J.. 652 " 
Philadelphia, Pa. 615 II 
Oakland, Calif. 482 II 
San Antonio, Texas 477 II 
TOTAL 37,300 II 
TOTAL ADDICTS IN NATION (REpORTED) 47,489 II , 
The FBN estimates that there are 60,000 addicts in the nation today, as compared with 
an estimated 200,000 during World War 1. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, 
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF NARCOTIC ADDICTION 7 (1964). As might be expected, drug 
use within a city is concentrated in areas of socioeconomic deprivation. In New York, for 
instance, it is estimated that 15% of the city's area, which contains 29% of the population, 
accounts for 83% of the city's drug use. CHEIN, GERARD, LEE & ROSENFELD, op. cit. supra 
note 60, at 39, 52. 
76 BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TRAFFIc IN Ol'IUM AND OT1IER DANGER-
OUS DRUGS 54 (1963). 
77 Clausen, supra note 60, at 38. Clausen notes that, within the cities having large addict 
populations, the narcotics use is concentrated in areas of low socioeconomic status and 
urban blight. These are also the areas with the highest delinquency and crime rates. He 
concludes that life in the urban slum is conducive to drug use. ld. at 41-43 i see Chein, The 
Status of Sociological and Social Psychological Knowledge Concerning Narcotics, in NARCOTIC 
DRUG ADDICTION PROBLEMS 146, 152 (Pub. Health Servo No. 1050, 1963). The recent 
New Jersey report listed 73% of that state's addicts as nonwhite persons, and concluded: 
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with high addict populations, many persons are exposed to narcotics with-
out ever becoming addicted, "indicating the presence of a specific and po-
tentially identifiable difference among individuals that separates those 
who will become addicted and those who will not.m8 It would seem that 
the disproportionate number of addicts in cities such as New York, Chi-
cago, Los Angeles and Washington is due partially to the ease of access 
in these areas. There are undoubtedly many addiction-prone individuals 
in rural areas that have fortunately never been exposed to narcotics. 
It would also seem that localities characterized by socioeconomic depriva-
tion and urban blight would tend to spawn addiction-prone individuals. 
Unstable family structures, particularly those lacking a strong father fig-
ure, are conducive to psychic problems and to narcotic addiction,79 and 
these families are often encountered in the urban slum. Furthermore, the 
inability of many individuals in these areas ever to attain even modest 
goals would seem to produce frustration and addiction proneness. . 
The individual may be introduced to narcotics in many ways, but, 
contrary to popular belief, he is not usually given his first dose by a 
"Since non-whites tend to be found among the lower socio-economic classes in the so-
called 'core cities,' it seems reasonable to assume that narcotic violations are related to 
disadvantaged social position in large urban areas." N.J. REpORT 35. 
78 Larimore, Medical Views on the Narcotic Problem, 31 F.R.D. 53, 80, 83 (1963). Profes-
sor Chein notes: "[W]e know of individuals who go on using a drug like heroin for several 
years on a more or less regular weekend basis and then, apparently without difficulty, 
quit." Chein, supra note 77, at 148. 
Another une:'{plained phenomenon which must be considered in this. context is the age 
factor in narcotics use. As of December 31, 1962, 3;4% of the nation's addicts were under 
21 years of age, 48.6% were 21-30, 37.0% were 31-40, and only 11.0% were over 40. BUREAU 
OF NARCOTICS, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, op. cit. supra note 76, at 55. There is much evidence 
that this concentration of addicts in the 21-30 age bracket is not a recent phenomenon. See 
AMA REPORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION 9. A 1936-1937 study of 1,036 addict-patients ad-
mitted to the Lexington Hospital revealed that 16.5% had begun the use of drugs before 
age 19. See IsbeIl, Clinical Research on Addiction in the United States, in NARCOTIC DRUG 
ADDICTION PROBLEMS 114, 125 (Pub. Health Servo Pub. No. 1050, 1963). It is apparently 
not known at this time whether there is a physiological or psychological explanation for 
this decrease in addiction after age 40, or whether it simply reflects the toll of death and 
long-term imprisonment. PRESIDENT'S REPORT 22. 
79 Chein, supra note 77, at 152-53; Fort, Heroin Addiction Among Young Men, 17 
PSYCHIATRY 251, 254-55 (1954); WikIer & Rasor, supra note 67, at 567. The latter authors 
describe a psychoanalytic formulation which suggests that male addicts whose childhood 
was characterized by the absence of a consistently strong father figure often suffer from 
arrested or regressed psychosexual development. In them, oral cravings have dominance over 
genital pleasures, and this can lead to frustration, hostility and the addiction-prone per-
sonality. 
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"pusher." Rather, his introduction is usually through a friend or acquaint· 
ance,80 although many addicts first "discovered" narcotics in the course 
of medical treatment, and some undoubtedly did initially succumb to the 
importunings of the fabled dope peddler. Of great importance is the fact 
that narcotic use does not inevitably or even usually lead to addiction un· 
less the individual is addiction prone. The relatively normal individual will 
probably not become addicted after having used a narcotic drug; 81 
indeed, it appears that many persons are able to use highly addicting drugs 
periodically over long periods of time without ever becoming addicted.82 
This is because the initial physiological effects of the drug are simply not 
irresistible in a normal individual,83 although they may be pleasurable. 
The addiction-prone type, however, experiences much more than physical 
gratification from his first experience with narcotics. He develops a psy· 
chological need or craving which he is probably powerless to ignore,84 and 
it is this psychological dependence, also called habituation, which renders 
his subsequent addiction virtually inevitable. When experiencing the effects 
of the drug, he finds that the frustration and anxiety of his daily existence 
mysteriously evaporates, that is, he obtains relief from his particular emo-
tional difficulties or symptoms. In many cases, this means relief from anx· 
80 CHEIN, GERARD, LEE & ROSENFELD, op. cit. supra note 60, at 12; .A:MEroCAN BAR FOUN-
DATION, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW 28-29 (1962); Mental Healtll M ollograpll No.2, supra 
note 74, at 6; PRESIDENT'S REpORT 4; REpORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION 13; Fort, supra note 
79, at 252. 
81 See note 78 supra. Chapman states: 
Information coming to us from various sources indicates that all users of drugs do not 
become addicts. Some may use it only on week ends as part of group behavior. Others 
take an occasional shot during the week or at irregular intervals and never become 
addicted. 
Chapman, Drug Addiction: Tile General Problem, Fed. Prob., Sept., 1956, p. 43. 
It has been noted that normal persons tend initially to react negatively to drugs, the 
experience being a rather distasteful one. These persons may become physically addicted 
during medical treatment, but, when introduced to drugs casually, do not usually continue to 
use them. This is because they do not experience the intense pleasure or euphoria which the 
addiction-prone person associates with use of the drug. MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra 
note 55, at 73. Maurer and Vogel suggest that "intensity of the pleasure from opiates seems 
to vary with the degree to which the individual may be called a neurotic or a psychopath 
•... " ld. at 74. 
82 See notes 78 & 81 supra. 
83 See note 81 supra. 
84 MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 55, at 73-75. The intensity of the pleasure the 
individual derives from the drug seems to be a function of the severity of the underlying 
mental disorder. See note 81 supra. The intensity of the psychological craving will, in turn, 
be related to the amount of pleasure obtained from use of the drug. See NoYES & KOLB, op. 
cit. supra note 58, at 474; Cameron, supra note 56, at 314-15. 
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iety associated with fear of hunger, pain and sexual urges, which are basic 
needs that the addiction-prone person may not be able to gratify in so-
cially acceptable ways.85 In addition, this type of individual apparently 
experiences an intense euphoria, a sustained emotional uplift which seems 
to be related to the capacity of the drug to satisfy basic needs.86 These 
pleasurable phenomena lead to an irresistible craving. The addiction-prone 
person has discovered something he may well have been searching for all 
his life. Habituation is a continuing psychic need or craving for this 
pleasure, and should not be confused with the physiological sensations 
derived from administration of the drug. Psychiatrists regard psychologi-
cal dependence as the most important characteristic of addiction.87 They 
conclude that the psychological meaning of the drug to the addict, that is, 
its capacity to reduce frustration and anxiety and to induce a feeling of 
pleasure and mastery, is far more significant than the physiological effects 
of the drug.88 One authority explains that "physical dependence is merely 
a complication."80 The exact meaning of a drug to a given addict will 
be closely related to the nature and intensity of his personality problems; 
hence, psychological dependence is often said to be a function of the under-
lying mental disorder.90 It is for this reason that normal individuals do 
not usually become addicted. Cameron has said: "Without such a psy-
chological 'need' there would be little, if any, addiction."91 
85 WIXLER, op. cit. supra note 55, at 54-55; CHErn, GERARD, LEE & ROSENFELD, op. cit. 
supra note 60, at 227-28. This symptom relief has also been called negative pleasure. See, 
e.g., KOLB, DRUG ADDICTION: A MEDICAL PROBLEM 93 (1962); WIkler & Rasor, supra note 
67, at 566. 
86 Kolb termed this sustained emotional uplift "positive pleasure," and suggested that it 
represents a form of relief from fundamental or permanent emotional problems. KOLB, op. 
cit. supra note 85, at 93. Others reject the idea of positive pleasure, reasoning that euphoria 
associated with drug use is simply a product of symptom relief. See, e.g., CHEIN, GERARD, 
LEE & ROSENFELD, op. cit. supra note 60, at 14, 228. Psychiatrists are agreed, however, that 
the pleasure felt by the potential addict is intense, whatever its exact psychological founda-
tion. 
87 E.g., CHErn, GERARD, LEE & ROSENFELD, op. cit. supra note 60, at 6; Vogel, Isbell & 
Chapman, supra note 55, at 1020. 
88 See Chapman, Methods of Treatment and Management of Drug Addiction, in NARCOTIC 
DRUG ADDICTION PROBLEMS 70, 71 (Pub. Health Servo Pub. No. 1050, 1963), 
80 Isbell, supra note 78, at 128-29. 
90 KOLB, op. cit. supra note 85, at 95; see WIKLER, op. cit. supra note 55, at 54-55. 
01 Cameron, supra note 56, at 315. In Mental Health Monograph No.2, supra note 74, 
at 5, the Public Health Service asserts: "By and large, the people who become addicts are 
those for whom drugs serve a special need, which can be summed up as the relief of pain. 
Last century the pain that led to addiction was often physical; today it is mainly psychic." 
The monograph goes on to state that today's addicts obtain relief from anxiety, tension, 
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As the addiction-prone individual continues to use the narcotic drug 
regularly, he soon discovers that the same dose fails to produce the original 
euphoric effect, and that from time to time he must increase the dose to 
produce the desired effect. This phenomenon is called "tolerance."o2 The 
average addict builds up tolerance to a dosage of narcotics greater than that 
amount sufficient to kill an average person.03 After prolonged administra-
tion of an opiate, physical dependence94 manifests itself. The user finds 
that he must continue to administer the drug regularly in order to avoid 
the withdrawal or abstinence syndrome. He is "hooked." He must have 
drugs not only to produce pleasure but also to avoid pain. It has been said 
that physical dependence "leads to continuity of intoxication with re-
sultant subservience of all phases of the addict's life to the one aim of ob-
taining and maintaining a constant supply of the drug."UI) He is compelled 
to obtain it and thus to prevent the withdrawal syndrome, which, in the 
feelings of inadequacy and other emotional problems by resorting to drugs. The report 
concludes that addicts have personality problems, and that addiction is a symptom of these 
problems. 
92 MARIE NYSWANDER ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 56, at 92; see Severs & Woods, The 
Phenomena of Tolerance, 14 AM. J. MED. 546 (1953), who state: "It is probably true that 
tolerance ultimately becomes of such a magnitude that the effect of the initial dose cannot 
be reproduced by excessive doses." Ibid. 
93 See AMA REPORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION 11; Cameron, supra note 56, at 315. 
94 Physical dependence is not a necessary condition of addiction as defined by the World 
Health Organization's Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs. That organization 
defines drug addiction as: 
a state of periodic or chronic intoxication produced by the repeated consumption of a 
drug (natural or synthetic). Its characteristics include: (1) an overpowering desire or 
need (compulsion) to continue taking the drug and to obtain it by any means; (2) a 
tendency to increase the dose; (3) a psychic (psychological) and generally a physical 
dependence on the effects of the drug; (4) an effect detrimental to the individual and 
to society. 
See PRESIDENT'S REPORT 101. 
This definition was necessary because the authors wanted to include cocaine and mari-
juana and other drugs that may produce psychological dependence but which do not 
produce physical dependence. However, this paper is concerned only with the opiates, all 
of which produce physical dependence. Furthermore, the President's Advisory Commission 
on Narcotic and Drug Abuse recently stated that only those drugs which produce physical 
and psychological dependence and tolerance are considered "truly addictive drugs." Id. at 
2. There have been many definitions of "narcotic addiction," usually depending upon a par-
ticular author's context and purposes. See MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 55, at 27-33. 
Several authors recently proffered a rather concise definition: "Drug addiction may be de-
fined as a state in which a person has lost the power of self control with reference to a 
drug and abuses the drug to such an extent that the person or society is harmed." Vogel, 
Isbell & Chapman, supra note 55, at 1019. 
95 Isbell & White, Clinical Characteristics of Addiction, 14 AM. J. MED. 558 (1953). 
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case of heroin addiction, will probably begin to manifest itself within 
eight or ten hours of abstinence, reach a peak in twenty-four hours, and 
gradually abate within a week.1l6 This illness is characterized, in the early 
stages, by yawning, rhinorrhea, lacrination, perspiration and waves of 
gooseflesh; as time goes on, muscles twitch, the body aches, and hot and 
cold flashes are experienced. Extreme restlessness gives way to constant 
motion. Nausea, vomiting and diarrhea develop, and loss of weight, even as 
much as ten pounds in twenty-four hours, is experienced. The addict is in 
extreme misery.1l7 "He may crawl into a corner, cover himself with a 
blanket even in the hottest weather, and beg piteously for a 'shot.' "98 
Death during "cold turkey" withdrawal, although rare, is not unknown.99 
It should be pointed out, however, that the severity of the withdrawal 
syndrome will vary depending upon the size of the habit the addict has 
acquired,lOo and many of today's addicts experience comparatively mild 
withdrawal because they have been injecting heavily adulterated or diluted 
doses of narcotics.101 
As the addict develops tolerance and increases his dosage, he discovers 
that more and more of his time is consumed simply in obtaining and ad-
ministering the drug. He must have four or five shots a day, and this en-
tails repeated purchases and trips to the place where he has secreted his 
96 With morphine, the onset of the withdrawal syndrome comes in 12 hours, the peak 
is reached in 48 hours and remains for 24 hours; with demerol, onset is in 3 to 4 hours, 
peak from 8 to 12, and the effects disappear in 4 to 5 days. See id. at 560-62. 
97 The withdrawal syndrome or illness (also called the abstinence syndrome) is described 
well in MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 55, at 84-87. For interesting studies of nar-
cotics withdrawal see Himmelsbach, Clinical Stuqies of Drug Addiction Ill, 69 ARCHIVES 
OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 766, 771-72 (1942). See also Isbell & White, supra note 95, at 560; 
Kolb & Himmelsbach, Clinical Studies of Drug Addiction, 94 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 759, 786-
93 (1938). 
98 Mental Health Monograph No.2, supra note 74, at 3. 
99 Cameron, supra note 56, at 315; Kolb, Drug Addiction- as a Public Health Problem, 
48 SCIENT. MONTHLY 391, 392, 398 (1939). . 
100 More specifically, the syndrome will vary depending on the individual and the duration 
and the intensity of use. MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra note 55, at 86; Cameron, supra 
note 56, at 315; Isbell & White, supra note 95, at 560. 
101 The first White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, held in Washington 
on Sept. 27 and 28, 1962, was addressed by President John F. Kennedy, who declared that 
"where 35 years ago addicts could purchase 100 per cent, or pure heroin, the sharply cur-
tailed amount entering the United States today requires traffickers to dilute their product to 
the point that the addict obtains only 3 to 5 percent heroin in the packet that he purchases." 
BUREAU OF NARConCS, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, op. cit. supra note 76, at 21; see Chapman, 
supra note 81, at 43. 
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paraphernalia for administration of the drug. He soon discovers that these 
excursions are incompatible with a full-time job, and so he becomes un-
employed. He also discovers that his habit is beginning to cost him approx-
imately twenty-five dollars a day,t°2 and this fact inevitably leads to more 
problems, which he will probably solve in one of two ways, or perhaps 
both: he may purchase a sufficient quantity to be able to sell the excess 
amount, after dilution, at a profit which will enable him to purchase a 
similar quantity and repeat the sales; or he may commit crimes 
such as housebreaking, larceny and shoplifting to obtain funds. loa If he 
commits crimes against property, he will have to appropriate property 
worth many times the amount he needs because of its decreased value 
to a fence?04 It appears that the majority of addicts support their habits 
by committing crimes against property. The Mayor's Advisory Council 
on Narcotic Addiction in New York City has concluded that the city's 
estimated 25,000 addicts spend between 500,000 and 700,000 dollars daily 
for narcotics, and that they raise this money by committing fifty per cent 
of the city's crime.105 
There are two prevalent theories concerning the relationship of narcotic 
addiction and crime. Law enforcement officials generally take the position 
that most addicts have engaged in criminal activities prior to their addic-
tion, and that addiction is but one more manifestation of their basic 
antisocial pattern of living.loo Those concerned with the treatment and 
rehabilitation of addicts generally conclude that criminal behavior on 
the part of addicts is usually directed toward obtaining funds to support 
addiction.l01 They base this conclusion on statistics demonstrating that 
102 See Mental Health Monograph No.2, supra note 74, at 7. A recent New Jersey survey 
estimates that the cost of drugs before the individual becomes addicted may run as low 
as $5 a day, but after addiction it may soar to $40 or $60 a day. N.J. REPORT 66. 
103 Female addicts often turn to prostitution to support their habits. Ibid. 
It is interesting to note that addicts who can afford the high price of drugs usually do not 
engage in crime. See Howe, An Alternative Solution to the Narcotics Problem, 22 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 132, 133 (1957). 
104 A New York report estimates that an addict with a $20-a-day habit might steal goods 
worth $15,000 to support his addiction for one year. Meiselas, supra note 60, at 4. 
105 Mental Health Monograph No.2, supra note 74, at 7. 
106 See, e.g., Anslinger, Narcotic Addiction as Seen by the Law-Enforcement Officer, Fed. 
Prob., June, 1957, pp. 34, 36. 
101 An excellent description of the relationship between narcotic addiction and crime is 
found in MAURER & VOGEL, NARCOTICS AND NARCOTIC AnDIcnON 227-59 (2d ed. 1962). These 
authors explode the popular fiction that opiate addiction induces violent crime; to the con-
trary, they conclude that "the secondary effects of opiates are in the main so pleasant and so 
soothing that any violent psychopath will be deterred from following any impulses that he 
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addicts commit proportionately more nonviolent crimes against property 
and less violent crimes than nonaddicted individuals.10s The addict is, of 
course, more likely to commit crime which will result in pecuniary gain; 
furthermore, because of his addiction, he is much less likely to commit 
violent crime, the effect of the opiate being a depressant one.109 A report 
recently adopted by the American Medical Association states that 
"opiates are quieting drugs that repress hostile urges, create a passive, 
dreamy state and depress sexual drives.1I110 This report goes on to con-
clude: 
There is no question that unstable antisocial persons have used opiates as long 
as these drugs have been known, and that such persons will continue to abuse 
these drugs seems a certainty. It is also true that a proportion of addicts did 
not engage in criminal pursuits prior to addiction and are not basically hostile, 
antisocial persons. What one cannot determine at present are the true relative 
percentages of these two types of persons. Both sides agree reasonably well that 
the majority of addicts do engage in crime (other than violation of the narcotic 
laws) after they become addicted in order to support their habits. There is also 
general agreement that the crimes committed by addicts are usually, but by 
no means always, crimes against property (theft, pickpocketing, shoplifting, 
confidence rackets) rather than crimes against the person (assault, murder; rape, 
and so on).l11 
may have to commit violent crime •••• " Id. at 233. They further conclude that the direct, 
physiological effects of opiates have little or no tendency to induce any type of crime, but that 
much nonviolent crime is committed by addicts attempting to support their habits. See 
generally LARNER & TEFFERTELLER, TIm ADDICT IN THE STREET (1964); MEYERS, SOCIAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN OPIATE ADDICTION 82 (1952); Chapman, Methods of Treatment 
and Management of Drug Addiction, in NARCOTIC DRUG ADDICTION PROBLEMS 70, 73 (Pub. 
Health Servo Pub. No. 1050, 1963); Chein & Rosenfeld, supra note 74, at 54; Firestone, 
Narcotics and Criminality, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 69, 76 (1957); Kolb, Factors That 
Have Influenced the Management and Treatment of Drug Addicts, in NARCOTIC DRUG AD-
DICTION PROBLEMS 23, 27 (Pub. Health Servo Pub. No. 1050, 1963). It is important to 
bear in mind that these observations are limited to the opiate drugs, which have a depres-
sant effect on the user. A stimulant, such as cocaine, may very well have a tendency to 
induce violent crime. See MAURER & VOGEL, op. cit. supra at 236; Kolb, supra note 99, at 
399. 
lOS See Mental Health Monograph NO.2, supra note 74, at 7; Firestone, supra note 107, 
at 71. 
109 See KOLB, op. cit. supra note 85, at 16-18; AMA REPORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION 13; 
Wortis, A Physicum Views Today's Narcotics Problem, in NARCOTIC DRUG ADDICTION PROB-
LEMS 174, 178 (Pub. Health Servo Pub. No. 1050, 1963); note 107 supra. 
110 A:M.A REPORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION 13. 
111 Id. at 15. Similarly, the Report of Joint AMA-ABA Committee on Narcotic Drugs, in 
NARCOTICS ADDICTION 41 (1963), states: 
Some responsible authorities state that the physical and psychological dependence of 
addicts on narcotic drugs, the compulsion to obtain them, and the high prices of the 
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Perhaps the question of whether addiction preceded criminality or vice 
versa, although important, is not the crucial inquiry. Irrespective of his 
previous way of life, the addict must make the unhappy choice between 
kicking the habit, either by himself or with help, or financing it through 
crime. Perhaps the primary concern of the law should be the reasonable-
ness of expecting him to choose the former. 
SYNTHESIS 
A threshold question is presented. When we hear it said that narcotic 
addiction is not a mental disease,112 are we being confronted with a mere 
conclusory opinion which begs the essential questions of criminal re-
sponsibility outlined in the McDonald opinion, or is it being asserted that 
this condition does not constitute a "mental abnormality"? If the former, 
the validity of the conclusion will depend upon factors which vary from 
individual to individual, factors which must be presented to the trier of 
fact, with whom rests the ultimate responsibility for deciding this ques-
tion. These factors will be considered subsequently. If the latter, how-
ever, the suggestion is that, since our conception of mental disease in-
cludes only mental abnormalities which produce the required impact on 
mental processes and behavior controls, narcotic addiction can never 
qualify, irrespective of its impact, because it is never a mental abnormality 
in the first instance. In other words, the McDonald definition of mental 
disease seems to require that a given condition be a recognized mental 
illness in the medical sense before a jury can be permitted to consider 
whether or not it constitutes a mental disease in the legal sense. 
Although there may be differences of opinion among psychiatrists on 
the question whether narcotic addiction is a mental abnormality, it would 
seem that the weight of authority supports the affirmative view. The Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual classifies 
narcotic addiction as a mental disorder.1l3 All authorities are agreed that 
the phenomenon of psychological dependence, which always accompanies 
drugs in the illicit market, are predominantly responsible for the crimes committed by 
addicts. Others claim that the drug itself is responsible for criminal behavior. The 
weight of evidence is so heavily in the favor of the former point of view that the 
question can hardly be called a controversial one .... Crimes of violence are rarely, 
and sexual crimes are almost never, committed by addicts. 
ld. at 44-45. See also N.J. REpORT 51-52. 
112 Such testimony is frequently heard from government experts at trials. See, e.g., Heard 
v. United States;-F.2d- (D.C. Cir. 1964); Jackson v. United States, -F.2d -
(D.C. Cir. 1964). 
113 DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 39. 
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addiction, represents some degree of modification of mental processes. 
The President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse 
recently stated: ' 
All [narcotic drugs] profoundly affect the central nervous system and the mind. 
The effects produced by taking these drugs are primarily on the brain and range 
from euphoria through excitement to depression .... Many bring about a deep 
feeling that everything in life must be made to serve the purpose of maintain-
ing a supply of the drug. These drugs are psychotoxic (mind poisoning). A 
psychotoxic drug is any chemical substance capable, of adducing mental effects 
which lead to abnormal behavior. They affect or alter to a substantive extent, 
consciousness, the ability to think, critical judgment, motivation, psychomotor 
coordination, or sensory perception.114 
It should be noted that the Commission was describing some of the im-
mediate effects produced by administration of a narcotic drug, but it 
was also describing altered mental conditions which outlast the im-
mediate feelings of euphoria, conditions which are the hallmarks of 
psychological dependence. 
The courts should aq:ept the proposition that narcotic addiction is a 
mental abnormality sufficient to raise a jury question of criminal re-
sponsibility. The Heard decision,115 holding to the contrary, should be 
reexamined. In deciding that the trial court had been correct in refusing 
to submit the issue of criminal responsibility to the jury, the court in 
Heard recounted the testimony of two psychiatrists who testified that 
the defendant was without mental disease or defect, and that he had no 
abnormal condition of the mind. One psychiatrist had testified as follows: 
Q. And would you consider this condition [narcotic addiction] to be an abnormal 
condition of the mind? 
[Objections intervened] 
THE COURT: I will let her answer. Was it abnormal in the sense it is a 
mental disease or mental defect? 
THE WITNESS: Abnormal in that it is not normal. Abnormal in the sense 
it is a mental disease in and of itself, no, it is not, Your Honor.116 
114 PRESIDENT'S REpORT 1. Recent studies by Dr. Georges Ungar of the Baylor University 
College of Medicine indicate that tolerance to morphine (an opium derivative similar to 
heroin) produces chemical changes in the brain, which were observed when Dr. Ungar 
injected nonaddicted animals with brain tissue from addicted animals, and discovered that 
the injected animals immediately developed tolerance. Significantly, extracts of other tissues 
from addicted animals did not produce this phenomenon. Washington Post, April 14, 1965, 
p. A3, col. 5. 
115 Heard v. United States, -- F.2d -- (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
116 - F.2d at -, n.4. 
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It seems fair to conclude that this psychiatrist believed that narcotic 
addiction is a mental abnormality, but did not feel that it is a mental 
disease. In his dissent, Judge Wright pointed out that each of the expert 
witnesses testified that Heard's addiction would affect his mental and 
emotional processes and his behavior controls. He continued: 
In short, each of them indicated that by our legal definition, as distinguished 
from their medical opinion, Heard may be suffering from a mental disease. Under 
the circumstances, it is difficult for me to understand why this is not the "some 
evidence" required to take the mental issue to the jury.117 
The majority opinion in Heard placed considerable emphasis on an ab-
sence of testimony suggesting deprivation of narcotics at the time of the 
offenses, reasoning that no evidence of impairment of behavior controls 
was presented. This distinction is untenable for several reasons. To begin 
with, the addict is probably in need of four or five "fixes" per day. Is it 
reasonable to require him to wait until the onset of withdrawal to think 
about his next dose? The addict's entire life becomes dedicated to main-
taining his supply; his need is constantly felt. He has experienced the 
panic of impending withdrawal many times, and he lives with this fear. 
Secondly, it would seem that in most instances evidence of deprivation 
could be obtained only through statements of the defendant, who will 
have every reason, under this ruling, to tell the psychiatrists that he 
needed a fix at the time in question. Thirdly, the majority ignored the im-
pact of addiction on mental processes, which impact, it is submitted, is 
sufficient to raise a jury issue. This impact will not always be great, but 
it will always be present. Considering that the decision whether or not 
"some evidence" of mental disease has been offered requires that doubts 
be resolved in favor of granting the instruction,1l8 it is difficult to justify 
the Heard decision. 
Assuming that a given addict-defendant has presented sufficient evi-
dence of mental illness to warrant a jury instruction, the determination of 
criminal responsibility will depend on the nature of his addiction and its 
effect on his mental processes and behavior controls. To make an intelli-
gent determination, the trier of fact must be given a sufficiently compre-
hensive picture of the defendant to permit a judgment regarding the 
impact of his addiction, together with whatever underlying disorder he 
manifests, on his mental and emotional processes and behavior controls. 
This is the obligation of the psychiatrist. His conclusion that addiction 
117 _ F.2d at -. 
118 See p. 1025 supra. 
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is or is not a mental illness is of little or no value in this context.l19 Each 
addict-defendant must be viewed as an individual whose mental processes 
and behavior controls have been to a certain extent affected and impaired 
because of his addiction. The legal question then becomes: is the extent 
of impairment with respect to the crime great enough to require exonera-
tion? The trier of fact cannot be expected to answer this question on the 
basis of condusory opinions. 
It is submitted that the task of the expert witness should be to apprise 
the jury of the individual's personality structure and his addiction and 
the impact of these factors on mental processes and behavior controls 
with reference to the following variables: (1) the nature of the crime 
charged; (2) whatever underlying psychiatric disorder the individual 
manifests; (3) the amount of psychological dependence on the drug; and 
( 4) the amount of physical dependence on the drug. 
The nature of the crime the defendant is alleged to have committed is 
important mainly because it may rule out the possibility of causation by 
addiction.120 If the crime is one of violence to the person, it would seem un-
related to the addiction, with the possible exception of robbery, which is 
usually committed for financial gain. If the crime is one against property 
or concerns the sale or possession of narcotics, it is the type of crime 
the addict commits to support his addiction, and the necessary causal 
connection is probably present. 
As previously indicated, the underlying mental disorder itself may 
negate criminal responsibility.l21 In most instances, however, the under-
lying disorder will be a personality disturbance which alone would present 
a dose question under Durham. Here the dual function of the underlying 
disorder must be recognized. Not only does it bear directly on the Dur-
ham-McDonald formula, but also it relates to the degree of addiction 
proneness manifested by the individual. A thorough explanation of the 
factor of addiction proneness will enable the trier of fact to determine the 
extent to which the addiction of the defendant was nearly inevitable, given 
the first shot. If addiction proneness is slight, the jury may infer that 
the addiction merely fits into a pattern of antisocial activity. To this end, 
the jury should be given detailed information regarding the defendant's 
childhood, his environment, his relationship with his parents, his view 
of himself and his explanation of his addiction. Of particular importance 
119 See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra; Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269 
(D.C. Cir. 1964). 
120 See notes 107 & 109 supra. 
121 See pp. 1029-30 supra. 
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is the defendant's description of his reaction to his first dose of narcotics. 
Did the drug miraculously provide the solution to all his problems, or was 
it merely a pleasurable experience worth repeating? Is the addiction the 
logical or even inevitable result of his personality structure, or could this 
individual have reasonably been expected to abstain from further use of 
the drug? It is believed that these judgments are usually made by the 
expert in arriving at his opinion; nevertheless, the jury should also be 
given the factual bases of the conclusion. It is interesting to note that 
when we speak of addiction proneness, we are considering the impact 
of the defendant's personality structure and mental processes on his addic-
tion, that is, the extent to which this individual's psychological makeup 
dictated subsequent addiction given the initial dose. Closely related 
to this consideration is the impact of the addiction on mental processes, 
which is a function of psychological dependence. 
Assuming that causation or productivity is not ruled out by the nature 
of the crime, the degree of the defendant's compulsion or need to con-
tinue using the drug would seem to be a critical factor. It is submitted 
that if this compulsion is sufficiently great, the addict-defendant should 
be exculpated, irrespective of underlying mental illness,122 although it 
would seem improbable that the compulsion could be great without at 
least some personality disorder. The degree of compulsion will be related 
to the psychological and physical dependence the individual has acquired. 
The extent of psychological dependence is usually a function of the 
underlying disorder, but it should be remembered that psychological 
dependence exists in addition to the mental disorder. In general, it 
122 In the case of Horton v. United States, 115 U.S. App. D.C. 184, 317 F.2d 595 (1963), 
five noted psychiatrists, Lawrence Kolb, Herbert Modlin, Winfred Overholser, Leon Salz-
man and Joseph Satten, submitted an amici curiae brief urging that the trial court erred 
in not granting judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on the ground of narcotic 
addiction. They stated: "[T]he main issue should have been not what causes addiction, 
but how the affliction itself once established, affects its victims." Brief for Amici Curiae, 
p. 4. They designated the compulsion to continue drug use as a pharmacological duress, and 
asserted that no rational basis exists for differentiation between this form of duress and 
any other form of duress which relieves an individual of criminal responsibility. Id. at S. 
In Castle v. United States, -F.2d-(D.C. Cir. 1964), Judge Wright discussed the 
theory of pharmacological duress, based on the addict's apprehension of the ,vithdrawal 
syndrome. He did not reach the point, however, nor did he comment on the validity of the 
theory. 
Chein and Rosenfeld state that addiction, because of legal and financial implications, 
leads "to a syndrome of activities which establish [the addict] .•• firmly outside of the 
legitimate pursuits of his peers. Granted the fact of addiction, the victim has no real 
freedom of choice in the matter." Chein & Rosenfeld, supra note 74, at 54. 
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should be true that, the greater the degree of psychological dependence, 
the greater will be the compulsion to continue use of the drug. When we 
speak of psychological dependence, it should be remembered that we are 
not concerned with the addict's desire to avoid the withdrawal syndrome, 
but rather with his psychological need for the drug as a palliative. He 
may believe that he needs the drug to relieve physical illness, or he may 
feel the need to avoid extreme anxiety or unhappiness. In short, he may 
not feel able to bear his daily existence without the drug. It is in this 
sense that addiction affects mental and emotional processes and behavior 
controls. The expert witness should be able to describe the nature of the 
addict-defendant's psychological compulsion to continue using his drug. 
The trier of fact should consider whether use of the drug resulted from a 
genuinely felt need, or whether it merely reflected a desire to flout au-
thority. One who has developed little psychological dependence, it is 
believed, should normally be expected to seek treatment rather than 
resort to criminality, for he ostensibly uses narcotics without substantial 
compulsion, although the necessity of avoiding the withdrawal sickness 
may represent a significant degree of compulsion if physical dependence 
is great. 
If the addict has developed an immense habit, it may not be reasonable 
to expect him to seek treatment unless he displays no underlying person-
ality disorder and little psychological dependence, in which case he should 
probably not be exculpated. Such an individual, however, is rare indeed. 
The compulsion which results from fear of excruciating withdrawal would 
seem to be substantial; however, with diluted narcotics, many addicts 
do not experience intense withdrawal symptoms, and in them the degree 
of physical dependence cannot be said to be great. In many instances it 
may be difficult to determine the amount of physical dependence because 
the addict will have undergone withdrawal before the psychiatrist sees 
him, and his own statements in this connection may not be reliable. The 
psychiatrist may, however, be able to find persons who observed the 
defendant during withdrawal, such as local jail personnel, and who may 
be able to furnish accurate information. Information regarding the length 
of time the individual has been using drugs and the daily dosage will also 
be useful in this connection. 
The individual's compulsion, which would seem to relate directly to 
his ability to control his behavior with respect to a crime committed for 
financial gain, is thus seen as a function of psychological and physical 
dependence. If the expert is equipped with adequate knowledge of these 
factors in an individual case he should be able to assist effectively in the 
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determination of criminal responsibility under Durham. Although perhaps 
somewhat inconclusive, his testimony will be infinitely more valuable 
than would a mere conclusion that narcotic addiction is or is not a mental 
illness. The President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug 
Abuse, speaking of the individual who commits crime to finance his habit, 
recently stated: "Whether he can be held criminally responsible can only 
be decided in the courts, case by case. The Commission cannot assert 
a general rule that every confirmed drug abuser is so impelled by his 
habit that he is not accountable for his acts under criminallaw.m28 The 
Commission is correct. The case-by-case determination need not be a 
guesswork process if the trier of fact is provided sufficient information. 
This is the obligation of defense counsel and the psychiatrist. 
123 PRESIDENT'S REpORT 3. 
